Browsing Political Science Theses and Dissertations by Issue Date

Duggan, Edward C., 1971- 2012-03-28T17:35:09Z 2012-03-28T17:35:09Z 2011-09 http://hdl.handle.net/1794/12100 xiv, 162 p. In my dissertation I argue that the invasion of Iraq was a part of a larger project by Vice President Dick Cheney and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld to reestablish the unconstrained use of U.S. military power after the defeat of Vietnam. The study presents the best evidence against the alternative explanations that the invasion of Iraq was the result of an overreaction to 9/11, the threat of Weapons of Mass Destruction, a plan to spread democracy in the Middle East, a desire to protect Israel or a plan to profit from Iraqi oil. The study also challenges the leading explanation among academics that emphasizes the role of the neoconservatives in the decision to invade. These academics argue that neoconservatives, such as Paul Wolfowitz and Richard Perle, successfully persuaded the American President, George W. Bush, and his Vice President, Dick Cheney, of the necessity to eliminate Saddam Hussein by winning an internal policy battle over realists, such as Secretary of State Colin Powell. With their narrow focus on neoconservatives and realists, scholars have largely overlooked a third group of hawkish policy makers, the primacists. This latter group, centered on Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld and Vice President Cheney, had a long standing goal of strengthening the U.S. military and presidential powers in order to pursue U.S. primacy. This goal manifests itself in the invasion of Iraq, a country in the heart of the geopolitically important, oil-rich region of the Persian Gulf. I demonstrate that it was the primacists, not the neoconservatives, who persuaded the President to go to war with Iraq. Through historical process tracing, especially through a close look at the careers of the major policy actors involved and their public statements as well as declassified documents, I provide strong evidence that these leaders wanted to pursue regime change in Iraq upon taking office. The invasion of Iraq would extend the War on Terror, providing an opportunity to pursue their long-held policy of strengthening the power of the presidency and transforming the military into a high-tech and well-funded force. Committee in charge: Jane Kellet Cramer, Chairperson/Advisor; Lars S. Skålnes, Member; Daniel J. Tichenor, Member; Val Burris, Outside Member en_US University of Oregon University of Oregon theses, Dept. of Political Science, Ph. D., 2011; rights_reserved International relations Political science Social sciences Bush, George W. (George Walker), 1946- Cheney, Richard B. Iraq War, 2003-2011 Hussein, Saddam, 1937-2006 War lobby Primacists The War Lobby: Iraq and the Pursuit of U.S. Primacy Iraq and the Pursuit of U.S. Primacy Thesis

Berk, Gerald Chastain, William Chastain, William 2012-10-26T03:58:37Z 2012-10-26T03:58:37Z 2012 http://hdl.handle.net/1794/12371 The Iraq War was an era of crisis and change within the U.S. Army. The failure of the army to adapt to the war revealed the obsolescence of post Vietnam army culture. Innovation experiences in the war were directionless and a new intellectual framework was required to deal with warfare that the army had long disliked: counterinsurgency. Major organizational change was accomplished by a coalition of generals led by Generals David Petraeus, Jack Keane, and Ray Odierno. These officers established a new intellectual framework with FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency. They challenged institutional military orthodoxy in Washington by proposing a renewed commitment to victory. Finally, they demonstrated the efficacy of counterinsurgency theory through a military campaign that “proved” FM 3-24. This major, yet limited, change in service culture fractured the consensus of the post Vietnam narrative and initiated an ongoing reinterpretation of the army’s philosophy of war. en_US University of Oregon All Rights Reserved. Iraq War Military Culture Organizational Change The Iraq War and the Post Vietnam Narrative: Culture and Change in the U.S. Army, 2005-2007 Electronic Thesis or Dissertation

Mitchell, Ronald Cleveland, Clayton 2013-07-11T19:58:59Z 2013-07-11T19:58:59Z 2013-07-11 http://hdl.handle.net/1794/12971 Why have states requested international authorization for their projections of military force more after 1989? One perspective suggests powerful states should not make such requests. Rather, they should look to their own power instead of international organizations. Another view suggests international authorization is a way to provide credible signals about state intentions. A third perspective suggests states view international authorization of military force as appropriate. I establish that states have changed their behavior, requesting international authorization more often after 1989. Then, I develop hypotheses involving material power, burden-sharing, informational signaling, and international norms. I assess their ability to explain the increase in authorization requests through evidence from over 150 military force projections by a wide range of states and through a detailed evaluation of United States behavior. The U.S. provides a strong test case for the theories evaluated, since powerful states should be least susceptible to pressures for requesting authorization, and yet it does so more frequently after 1989. I find the expectation that states should request international authorization emerged after the U.S. set a precedent during the Persian Gulf War. The end of the Cold War changed the perceived "viability" of different strategies for projecting military force for U.S. policy-makers. Requesting authorization from the UN became a plausible alternative. The decision to request international authorization--and the justifications U.S. decision makers offered for doing so--led to the expectation by other states that the U.S. would do so for future projections of military force. This international norm helps explain the politics of international authorization for the airstrikes on Iraq (1998), the Iraq War (2003) and the Libyan intervention (2011). The response of other countries to the Clinton Administration's failure to request authorization for airstrikes on Iraq in 1998 demonstrates that expectations regarding whether the U.S. should request authorization had shifted. The subsequent consolidation of the norm helps explain the requests for authorization by the Bush Administration for the Iraq War in 2003 and by the Obama Administration for Libya in 2011. The dissertation increases our understanding of the relationship, and the role of authority, between states and international organizations. en_US University of Oregon All Rights Reserved. International Norms International Organizations Military Intervention Security UN Security Council U.S. Foreign Policy Storming the Security Council: The Revolution in UNSC Authority Over the Projection of Military Force Electronic Thesis or Dissertation Ph.D. doctoral Department of Political Science University of Oregon

Parsons, Craig Abney, Margaret 2013-10-03T23:36:21Z 2013-10-03T23:36:21Z 2013-10-03 http://hdl.handle.net/1794/13315 During the 2011 Arab Spring protests, the Presidents of Egypt and Tunisia lost their seats as a result of popular protests. While protests occurred in Morocco during the same time, King Mohammed VI maintained his throne. I argue that the Moroccan king was able to maintain his power because of factors that he has because he is a king. These benefits, including dual religious and political legitimacy, additional control over the military, and a political situation that make King Mohammed the center of the Moroccan political sphere, are not available to the region's presidents. en_US University of Oregon All Rights Reserved. Arab Spring King Mohammed VI of Morocco Monarchy Morocco Avoiding the Arab Spring? The Politics of Legitimacy in King Mohammed VI's Morocco Electronic Thesis or Dissertation M.A. masters Department of Political Science University of Oregon

Myagkov, Mikhail Deckert, Joseph 2013-10-03T23:37:35Z 2013-10-03T23:37:35Z 2013-10-03 http://hdl.handle.net/1794/13331 Election fraud is a serious problem in a number of modern democracies. While election observers can combat this problem to some extent, election forensics aims to provide a low-cost supplement. Forensic tools uncover irregular patterns in aggregate election data which are consistent with fraud. This dissertation improves upon existing tools and establishes methods of controlling for other factors which could cause irregular patterns. These tools are utilized in three cases studies in an effort to better understand the nature of election fraud. en_US University of Oregon All Rights Reserved. democracy election forensics fraud Patterns of Fraud: Tools for Election Forensics Electronic Thesis or Dissertation Ph.D. doctoral Department of Political Science University of Oregon