Nouweland, Anne van den

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https://hdl.handle.net/1794/10984

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Open Access
Rock-Paper-Scissors; A New and Elegant Proof
(University of Oregon, Dept of Economics, 2007-09-12) Nouweland, Anne van den
I provide an elegant proof identifying the unique mixed Nash equilibrium of the Rock-Paper-Scissors game. The proof is based on intuition rather than elimination of cases. It shows that for any mixed strategy other than the one that puts equal probability on each of a player’s actions, it holds that this strategy is not a best response to any mixed strategy that is a best response to it.
Open Access
The truncated core for games with limited aspirations
(University of Oregon, Dept of Economics, 2007-10) Nouweland, Anne van den
We define and study games with limited aspirations. In a game with limited aspirations there are upper bounds on the possible payoffs for some coalitions. These restrictions require adjustments in the definitions of solution concepts. In the current paper we study the effect of the restrictions on the core and define and study the so-called truncated core.
Open Access
Interval values for strategic games in which players cooperate
(University of Oregon, Dept of Economics, 2005-09-22) Carpente, Luisa; Casas-Mendez, Balbina; García-Jurado, I. (Ignacio); Nouweland, Anne van den
In this paper we propose a method to associate a coalitional interval game with each strategic game. The method is based on the lower and upper values of finite two-person zero-sum games. We axiomatically characterize this new method. As an intermediate step, we provide some axiomatic characterizations of the upper value of finite two-person zero-sum games.
Open Access
Status Equilibrium in Local Public Good Economies
(University of Oregon, Dept of Economics, 2005-09-19) Nouweland, Anne van den; Wooders, Myrna Holtz
We define a concept of status equilibrium for local public good economies. A status equilibrium specifies one status index for each agent in an economy. These indices determine agents’ cost shares in any possible jurisdiction. We provide an axiomatic charaterization of status equilibrium using consistency properties.
Open Access
The Shapley valuation function for strategic games in which players cooperate
(University of Oregon, Dept. of Economics, 2004-02-19) Carpente, Luisa; Casas-Mendez, Balbina; García-Jurado, I. (Ignacio); Nouweland, Anne van den
In this note we use the Shapley value to define a valuation function. A valuation function associates with every non-empty coalition of players in a strategic game a vector of payoffs for the members of the coalition that provides these players’ valuations of cooperating in the coalition. The Shapley valuation function is defined using the lowervaluebased method to associate coalitional games with strategic games that was introduced in Carpente et al. (2003). We discuss axiomatic characterizations of the Shapley valuation function.
Open Access
The Formation of Communication Networks in Cooperative Games
(University of Oregon, Dept. of Economics, 2004-01) Nouweland, Anne van den
I survey the literature on network formation in situations where the possible gains from cooperation of coalitions of agents are modeled by a coalitional game. I discuss the models that appear in the literature and their predictions on the networks that will be formed according to various equilibrium concepts, as well as the eventual payoffs to the players in equilibrium networks.
Open Access
Values for strategic games in which players cooperate
(University of Oregon, Dept. of Economics, 2003-02-27) Carpente, Luisa; García-Jurado, I. (Ignacio); Casas-Mendez, Balbina; Nouweland, Anne van den
In this paper we propose a new method to associate a coalitional game with each strategic game. The method is based on the lower value of matrix games. We axiomatically characterize this new method, as well as the method that was described in von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944). As an intermediate step, we provide some axiomatic characterizations of the value and the lower value of matrix games.
Open Access
Demonstrating worker quality through strategic absenteeism
(University of Oregon, Dept. of Economics, 2002-06-14) Harbaugh, William; Nouweland, Anne van den
Determining the productivity of individual workers engaged in team production is difficult. Monitoring expenses may be high, or the observable output of the entire team may be some single product. One way to collect information about individual productivity is to observe how total output changes when the composition of the team changes. While some employers may explicitly shift workers from team to team for exactly this reason, the most common reasons for changes in team composition are at least partly voluntary: vacation time and sick days. In this paper, we develop a model of optimal absenteeism by employees which accounts for strategic interactions between employees. We assume the employer uses both observed changes in output and the strategies of the employees to form beliefs about a given worker’s type. We argue that the model we develop is applicable to a variety of workplace situations where signaling models are not, because it allows a worker’s decisions to provide information about
Open Access
Cooperative Multicriteria Games with Public and Private Criteria; An Investigation of Core Concepts
(University of Oregon, Dept. of Economics, 2001-06-01) Voorneveld, Mark; Nouweland, Anne van den
A new class of cooperative multicriteria games is introduced which takes into account two different types of criteria: private criteria, which correspond to divisible and excludable goods, and public criteria, which in an allocation take the same value for each coalition member. The different criteria are not condensed by means of a utility function, but left in their own right. Moreover, the games considered are not single-valued, but each coalition can realize a set of vectors representing the outcomes of each of the criteria depending on several alternatives. Two core concepts are defined: the core and the dominance outcome core. The relation between the two concepts is studied and the core is axiomatized by means of consistency properties.
Open Access
Strongly stable networks
(University of Oregon, Dept. of Economics, 2001-06-01) Jackson, Matthew O.; Nouweland, Anne van den
We analyze the formation of networks among individuals. In particular, we examine the existence of networks that are stable against changes in links by any coalition of individuals. We show that to investigate the existence of such strongly stable networks one can restrict focus on a component-wise egalitarian allocation of value. We show that when such strongly stable networks exist they coincide with the set of efficient networks (those maximizing the total productive value). We show that the existence of strongly stable networks is equivalent to core existence in a derived cooperative game and use that result to characterize the class of value functions for which there exist strongly stable networks via a "top convexity" condition on the value function on networks. We also consider a variation on strong stability where players can make side payments, and examine situations where value functions may be non-anonymous depending on player labels.
Open Access
A Mechanism for Inducing Cooperation in Non-Cooperative Environments: Theory and Applications
(University of Oregon, Dept. of Economics, 2000-02-01) Ellis, Christopher J.; Nouweland, Anne van den
We construct a market based mechanism that induces players in a non-cooperative game to make the same choices as characterize cooperation. We then argue that this mechanism is applicable to a wide range of economic questions and illustrate this claim using the problems of "The Tragedy of the Commons" and "R&D Spillovers in Duopoly".

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