Browsing Faculty Profiles by Subject "Game theory"

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  • Bargaining by Children 
    Liday, Steven G.; Harbaugh, William; Krause, Kate (University of Oregon, Dept. of Economics, 2002-07-20)
    We study the development of bargaining behavior in children age seven through 18, using ultimatum and dictator games. We find that bargaining behavior changes substantially with age and that most of this change appears to ...
  • Gradualism in Tax Treaties with Irreversible Foreign Direct Investment 
    Chisik, Richard; Davies, Ronald B. (University of Oregon, Dept. of Economics, 2000-06-01)
    Bilateral international tax treaties govern the host country taxation for the vast majority of the world’s foreign direct investment (FDI). Of particular interest is the fact that the tax rates used under these treaties ...
  • A Mechanism for Inducing Cooperation in Non-Cooperative Environments: Theory and Applications 
    Ellis, Christopher J.; Nouweland, Anne van den (University of Oregon, Dept. of Economics, 2000-02-01)
    We construct a market based mechanism that induces players in a non-cooperative game to make the same choices as characterize cooperation. We then argue that this mechanism is applicable to a wide range of economic questions ...
  • Prospect Theory in Choice and Pricing Tasks 
    Harbaugh, William; Krause, Kate; Vesterlund, Lise (University of Oregon, Dept. of Economics, 2002-07-20)
    The most distinctive prediction of prospect theory is the fourfold pattern (FFP) of risk attitudes. People are said to be (1) risk-seeking over low-probability gains, (2) risk-averse over low-probability losses, (3) ...
  • Reversals of preference between bids and choices in gambling decisions 
    Slovic, Paul; Lichtenstein, Sarah (Journal of Experimental Psycholog, 1971)
    Subjects in 3 experiments chose their preferred bet from pairs of bets, and later bid for each bet separately. In each pair, one bet had· a higher probability ·of winning (P bet); the other offered more to win (S bet). ...
  • The Shapley valuation function for strategic games in which players cooperate 
    Carpente, Luisa; Casas-Mendez, Balbina; García-Jurado, I. (Ignacio); Nouweland, Anne van den (University of Oregon, Dept. of Economics, 2004-02-19)
    In this note we use the Shapley value to define a valuation function. A valuation function associates with every non-empty coalition of players in a strategic game a vector of payoffs for the members of the coalition that ...

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